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Abstract  
By international comparison, Finnish pupil achievement is high and school 
achievement differences small. The Finnish education system is unusual also 
because there are no national testing programs and information on school quality 
measures is not publicly disclosed. Is school quality capitalized into house prices 
in this environment? Using a boundary discontinuity research design and data 
from Helsinki, we find that it is: a one standard deviation increase in average test 
scores increases prices by roughly 2.5 percent, which is comparable to findings 
from the U.K and the U.S. This price premium is related to pupils’ socio-
economic background rather than school effectiveness. 
Key words: Boundary discontinuity, house prices, school quality, spatial 
differencing 
JEL classification numbers: C21, H75, I20, R21  
 
Tiivistelmä  
Tutkimuksessa tarkastellaan sitä, vaikuttavatko peruskoulujen väliset erot 
asuntojen hintoihin Helsingissä. Kansanvälisessä vertailussa suomalaisten 
oppilaiden oppimistulokset ovat hyviä ja samanaikaisesti koulujen väliset erot 
oppimistuloksissa pieniä. Suomalainen koulujärjestelmä eroaa useiden muiden 
maiden järjestelmistä myös siksi, että suomalaisia peruskouluja ei testata 
systemaattisesti standardoiduilla kokeilla, eikä tuloksia julkisteta niissä harvoissa 
tapauksissa, joissa kunnan kaikki koulut testataan. Näistä seikoista huolimatta 
havaitsemme, että koulujen väliset erot heijastuvat selvästi asuntojen hintoihin. 
Tulostemme mukaan yhden keskihajonnan nousu koulun keskimääräisessä 
standardoidussa koepistemäärässä nostaa asuntojen hintoja keskimäärin 2,5 
prosenttia. Vaikutus on samaa suuruusluokkaa kuin Isossa-Britanniassa ja 
Yhdysvalloissa, joissa koulujen väliset erot ovat aiempien tutkimusten mukaan 
Suomea suurempia. Erityis- tai vieraskielisten oppilaiden osuudet sen sijaan eivät 
  
 
vaikuta asuntojen hintoihin. Lisätarkastelut viittaavat siihen, että asunnonostajille 
on tärkeää koulun oppilaiden sosioekonominen tausta, ei koulun vaikutus 
oppimiseen. 
Asiasanat: Asuntojen hinnat, koulun laatu 
JEL-luokittelu C21, H75, I20, R21 
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1. Introduction 
Empirical evidence from a number of studies shows that differences in school 
quality, measured by school value-added, average test scores, school inputs or peer 
characteristics, are capitalized into house prices, thus revealing the valuation that 
homebuyers place on them (Black and Machin 2011; Nguyen-Hoang and Yinger 2011). 
However, current empirical evidence is tilted towards countries where school quality 
differences are considerable, mainly the U.S. and the U.K., and where residential 
location and school choice can potentially make a large difference in the education 
quality and life chances of children. It is unclear whether these results can be 
generalized to countries where overall school quality is high and differences in general 
small.  
In this paper, we use hedonic regression techniques with a boundary discontinuity 
research design to study whether school quality differences are capitalized into house 
prices in Helsinki, the capital city of Finland. The Finnish case is of particular interest 
because in recent years the basic education system of Finland has been raised to 
something of a role model status in many countries.1 The reason for the interest is that 
by international comparison Finnish pupil achievement is high and at the same time 
school level achievement differences are among the lowest in the world.2  
The Finnish education system is quite distinct in other ways as well. The key 
features of the Finnish education policy for the purposes of this paper are that there is 
no central or nationwide testing program in comprehensive schools and standardized 
tests are not used in evaluating school accountability. Moreover, whenever pupils or 
schools are tested using standardized tests, the results are not publicly released, but are 
                                                 
1 The Finnish basic education system has received a great deal of attention around the world, especially in 
the U.K. and the U.S. One example of this is that the book “Finnish Lessons: What can the world learn 
from educational change in Finland” written by Pasi Sahlberg and published in 2011, has been already 
translated to 16 languages. One can also find a large number of stories praising the Finnish education 
system in newspapers, see e.g.  
http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/12/what-americans-keep-ignoring-about-finlands-
school-success/250564/ 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/finland/10489070/OECD-education-report-Finlands-
no-inspections-no-league-tables-and-few-exams-approach.html.  
2 According to the findings of the OECD’s Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) 
implemented every third year since 2000, Finnish pupils are among the best performing students 
worldwide. Perhaps the most striking result from the PISA studies, however, is the extremely low 
between-school variance in student achievement in Finland. See OECD (2011 and 2013). 
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only used internally by the schools or for research purposes. Another relevant difference 
compared to many other countries is that there are no school inspections that could give 
additional information on school performance based on the subjective evaluation of 
inspectors.3 The goal of these types of policies in Finland is to give children in all 
schools equal opportunities so that parents have no need for “school shopping” and 
simply send their children to the closest available elementary school. This policy is 
reinforced by the high qualifications of Finnish teachers who, by and large, all have a 
master’s degree in education.4 
School quality and residential-based access to schools also bear on the question of 
educational and residential segregation. The prevention of socio-economic and ethnic 
segregation is one of the main objectives of housing policy in Finland, and especially in 
Helsinki (e.g. Vaattovaara and Kortteinen 2003; Dhallman and Vilkama 2009). To 
further achieve this goal, the city of Helsinki practices positive discrimination in school 
finance so that schools with pupils from disadvantaged backgrounds or from ethnic 
minorities (based on mother tongue) receive more funding.  
With these institutional aspects in mind, it is interesting to find out whether 
parents really perceive that the Finnish schools are of equal quality. Anecdotal evidence 
suggests that parents in Helsinki go to some lengths in securing their child’s place in a 
particular school.5  In this paper, we ask whether this pattern is present more generally 
by studying whether homebuyers are willing to pay a house price premium in order to 
send their children to schools which they perceive to be of high quality.  
We answer this question using house price and school quality data (standardized 
math test scores from the 6th grade and the shares of pupils with special needs and 
foreign-language) for the city of Helsinki. The city is divided into school catchment 
areas so that parents can secure a place for their child in a particular school by buying a 
housing unit within the school’s catchment area.  
                                                 
3 For example, using the U.K. data Hussain (2014) shows that inspection ratings can provide additional 
information on school quality, which is relevant for students and parents on top of other observable 
school characteristics. 
4 Moreover, teaching is a highly appreciated profession and education programs are among the most 
difficult programs to access in Finnish universities. See e.g. OECD (2013) for more details. 
5 Perhaps the most famous example is the story reported in Helsingin Sanomat (21.5.2011), the largest 
newspaper in Finland, about a couple who divorced on paper so that their child could gain residence 
within a particular catchment area. 
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Our identification strategy makes use of these catchment area boundaries and is 
based on the now well-established spatial differencing method (Duranton et al. 2011; 
Fack and Grenet 2010; Gibbons et al. 2013). We match each transaction in our data near 
a catchment area boundary to the nearest transaction from the same building type 
(multi-storey or row house) that lies on the other side of that boundary and then estimate 
hedonic regression models using the differences between the matched transacted units. 
The discontinuity in school quality at the catchment area boundaries is fuzzy because 
pupils can apply to schools other than the one in their catchment area. This may dilute 
the relationship between school quality and house prices as shown by Fack and Grenet 
(2010), Machin and Salvanes (2010) and Brunner et al. (2012) in other contexts. On the 
other hand, we use data only for multi-storey and row houses in a dense urban area, 
which means that the matched units are located very close to each other making this 
identification strategy particularly appealing.6  
Our results can be summarized as follows. The average standardized test scores 
are capitalized into house prices, while the share of pupils with special needs and the 
share of foreign-language pupils are not. A one standard deviation increase in the test 
scores increases prices by roughly 2.5 percent. This result is robust across a number of 
specifications and the size of the effect is comparable to findings from the U.K. and the 
U.S.  Since the 6th grade is the final year of the first part of elementary schooling, the 
test score result may reflect either parents’ demand for schools effectiveness (or value-
added) or pupil composition or a mixture of both. Additional results based on proxies of 
parents’ characteristics suggest that the test score result is driven by parents demand for 
socio-economically favourable pupil composition, not for school effectiveness.  
The results are rather surprising and indicate that Finnish parents do perceive clear 
quality differences among elementary schools, even though school differences in 
student achievement are low by international comparison. The finding that parents value 
the quality of peer composition implies that perceived school quality differences 
together with a catchment area-based pupil intake can affect residential and school 
segregation patterns, even when school quality differences are relatively low and school 
quality information is not disclosed.  
                                                 
6 In our baseline specification the maximum (mean) distance between matched units is 400 (235) meters. 
The results are robust to narrowing this maximum (mean) distance to 200 (134) meters. 
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we explain our 
empirical strategy. Section 3 describes the data and discusses the details of the school 
admission system in Helsinki and our school quality measures. Section 4 presents the 
econometric results and Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Empirical strategy 
The starting point of our analysis is the hypothesis that spatial differences in the 
quality of local public goods are reflected in house prices, thus revealing households’ 
marginal valuation of them (e.g. Black and Machin 2011). Elementary schools are a 
prominent example because the right to attend a particular school is often tied to 
residential location. The general problem in estimating the effects of school quality on 
house prices is that some neighbourhood variables that affect prices are unobservable 
and may also be correlated with school quality. This leads to endogeneity problems and 
biased estimates in a simple OLS regression model. However, if access to schools is 
spatially bounded based on catchment areas, there should be a discrete change (or 
discontinuity) in school quality at the catchment area boundaries while other 
neighbourhood characteristics develop smoothly. In this case, a solution to the omitted 
variable problem is to concentrate on houses at school catchment area boundaries and 
use the discrete change in quality for identification. 
To show this more formally, we follow Gibbons et al. (2013) and consider the 
following hedonic regression model: 
 
(1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ,p s l x l g l uβ γ= + + +   
 
where p refers to the (log) sale price of a housing unit and s to school quality, possibly a 
vector of school attributes, resources and effectiveness, that a homebuyer can access 
when residing in location l. The vector x includes observable housing unit attributes, 
whereas g(l) refers to unobservable neighbourhood attributes (other than school quality) 
in location l. The last term u represents unobservable unit attributes and errors that we 
assume to be uncorrelated with s, x and l. 
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Our interest lies in β, which is the causal effect of school quality on housing 
prices. A simple OLS estimation of Eq. (1) will produce inconsistent estimates because 
in general Cov[s(l), g(l)] ≠ 0. This problem can be solved by using spatial differencing 
and catchment area boundaries. The spatially differenced model for units in location i 
and j can be written as 
 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) .i j i j i j i j i jp p s l s l x l x l g l g l u uβ γ       − = − + − + − + −         
 
As shown by Gibbons et al. (2013), choosing i and j to be geographically as close as 
possible and on opposite sides of a catchment area boundary eliminates the correlation 
between unobservable neighbourhood attributes and school quality, while maintaining 
variation in school quality, which identifies the causal effect of interest.7  
In practice, of course, we do not have enough sales data exactly at the boundaries 
and we need to include observations from further away. As in the standard regression 
discontinuity design (RDD), this induces a bias-variance trade-off: including more 
observations from further away from a boundary increases the precision of the 
estimates, but at the same time increases the risk of bias because the assumption of 
constant neighbourhood quality is less and less likely to hold as distance increases (Lee 
and Lemieux 2010).  
As Gibbons et al. (2013) point out, three assumptions need to hold for the spatial 
differencing strategy to work. First, there has to be variation or a discontinuity in school 
quality that homebuyers face at the catchment area boundaries. This discontinuity can 
be fuzzy so that there is a change in the expected school quality at the boundaries. This 
is the case in our data as a homebuyer can secure a place for his/her child in a particular 
school by buying a unit within the school’s catchment area. This means that the 
probability of gaining access to the school jumps from something below unity to one. 
Second, there cannot be discontinuities in other neighbourhood characteristics exactly at 
the boundaries. These may arise due to exact residential sorting at the boundaries, as 
                                                 
7 Instead of spatial differencing, one could use boundary fixed effects (Black 1999, Bayer et al. 2007) 
where one subtracts the boundary level means from each observation. However, if boundaries are long 
with only a few observations at each boundary, the fixed effects may not be sufficient to wash away 
confounding unobservables. See Black and Machin (2011) for a discussion of the merits of different 
identification strategies.  
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suggested by Bayer et al. (2007), or to other boundaries that coincide with catchment 
areas. Third, there should be no spatial trends in other neighbourhood characteristics or 
amenities across boundaries. Possible spatial trends become a problem because we 
never have enough data exactly at the boundary. Adding more data further away from 
the boundary increases the risk that neighbourhood amenities differ on average on 
different sides of a boundary. Discontinuities in other neighbourhood characteristics is a 
more severe problem than spatial trends because, at least in principle, adding more data 
near a boundary solves the spatial trend problem, but discontinuities fundamentally 
invalidate the design and bias the results with respect to willingness to pay for school 
quality regardless of data size. In this case, we could find a discontinuity in prices at the 
boundaries, but would mistakenly attribute it to variations in school quality.  
We argue that we have a particularly good research design and data so that these 
assumptions are likely to hold at least approximately. First, we use data for a single 
municipality, which means that other policies, such as local tax rates, stay constant 
within the area. Second, we can add an extensive set of close neighbourhood 
characteristics, measured at a 250 m x 250 m grid level, as control variables and show 
that including them does not affect our results. These controls are essential if 
households sort across catchment areas and the sorting prevails at the boundaries (Bayer 
et al. 2007).8 Third, we can eliminate boundaries that coincide with major geographic 
obstacles that may induce discontinuities in neighbourhood quality, such as major roads, 
railways or waterways. Finally, we use transaction data only for multi-storey buildings 
and row houses. Thus, our data come from a dense urban area so that the average 
distance between matched transactions is short, which considerably mitigates the 
problem of confounding spatial trends. It should also be easier to detect capitalization in 
dense areas because housing supply is inelastic (e.g. Hilber and Mayer, 2009).  
While solving the major identification problem, spatial differencing introduces 
some problems for statistical inference because a particular housing unit may be the 
                                                 
8 Bayer et al. (2007) also stress that household sorting may affect whose marginal willingness to pay can 
be identified from a hedonic regression when households have heterogeneous preferences for school 
quality. For example, households buying units on the “high quality” side of a boundary may have a 
systematically higher willingness to pay for school quality than households buying on the “low quality” 
side. However, Bayer et al. (2007) do find that a hedonic regression produces a good approximation of 
the mean willingness to pay as long as there are a high number of different quality choices available, 
which is the case when there are many schools within in a housing market (50 in our case). See also 
Bayer and McMillan (2008) for further discussion.  
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closest match for a number of units on the opposite side of the boundary. This induces 
correlation between all differenced observations that share a match. A simple solution to 
this problem would be to cluster standard errors at the boundary level, which allows for 
arbitrary correlation between all observations on either side of a given boundary.9 
However, in our baseline estimations we have only 33 clusters (boundaries) and in some 
of our heterogeneity and robustness analyses the number of clusters is as low as 26. 
This may not be sufficient for the standard clustering procedure to work reliably (see 
Bertrand et al. 2004). Therefore, in addition to reporting clustered standard errors, we 
also report statistical significance based on the cluster generalization of the wild 
bootstrap suggested by Cameron et al. (2008). As shown by Cameron et al. (2008), the 
wild bootstrap procedure leads to improved inference when there are few clusters.  
 
3. Finnish school system and data 
3.1. School system  
In Finland, local governments (municipalities) are responsible for providing 
primary education. The primary education system consists of a nine-year compulsory 
comprehensive school starting in the year the child turns seven.10 Comprehensive 
school is usually divided into a primary school with grades 1–6 and a lower secondary 
school with grades 7–9, but in some cases grades 1–9 are taught in the same school 
(joint comprehensive school).11 Most of the comprehensive schools are public schools 
and children usually attend the school closest to where they live. Comprehensive 
schooling is completely free for the whole age group and includes daily lunches. There 
are also some private schools in Finland, but these schools share the legislation of the 
public school system and are therefore very similar to public schools. Elite private 
schools charging sizable student fees do not exist in Finland. 
Since the mid 1990’s, school choice has, in principle, been free in Finland. 
However, in practice municipalities are still divided into catchment areas and the 
                                                 
9 A boundary, rather than a school, is the correct clustering level for other reasons also, as explained by 
Fack and Grenet (2010). 
10 There is also a one-year optional pre-school before primary school. 
11 This division is no longer used officially. However, many schools still offer grades based on this 
division. 
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municipality guarantees each child living in a catchment area a place in the catchment 
area’s school. Buying a unit within a catchment area of a particular school thus secures 
a place in that school. 
Pupils are also allowed to attend other schools. To do this, parents need to apply 
for a place in another school and the school may accept the application if there is space 
to accommodate pupils from other catchment areas. When there are limited places 
available, acceptance depends on whether siblings attend the school, travel time, 
aptitude tests or in some cases a lottery. This means that in our setup the discontinuity in 
school quality at the boundaries is fuzzy so that there is a discrete jump in expected 
school quality. Linking housing sales to school data is straightforward because in 
Helsinki each housing unit is assigned to one elementary school (grades 1–6).12 
 
3.2. School quality measures 
What exactly are the right school quality measures, and what school 
characteristics homebuyers are willing to pay for, are questions that still remain 
unanswered (e.g. Rothstein 2006, Black and Machin 2011). In this study, we follow the 
existing literature and use a number of different measures. More specifically we use 
average standardized math test scores from the 6th grade, the share of foreign-language 
pupils and the share of pupils with special needs. The school quality measures are for 
2008.13 
The latter two school quality indicators are measured over grades 1–6 and they 
both aim to capture extreme aspects of pupil composition. Having pupils with special 
needs or a foreign language in ordinary classes may have negative effects on the 
learning of others if they need much extra attention and drain teachers’ resources.14 
                                                 
12 Homebuyers ought to be well informed about the school district that a house belongs to. For example, 
in Helsinki there is a free internet-based service offered by the city of Helsinki which assigns every 
address to a specific elementary school.  
13 We also obtained data on schools’ total expenditure. We decided not to use it, because per-pupil 
expenditure is not comparable across schools due to reporting problems and measurement errors. These 
problems are mostly related to comparing schools that have only grades 1–6 to schools that have grades 
1–9. 
14 Those pupils that do not satisfy the learning objectives are considered pupils with special needs. The 
reasons for special needs usually stem from different problems in the evolution of physical and mental 
abilities. Foreign-language pupils are pupils that do not have Finnish or Swedish (or Lappish) as their 
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Unfortunately, we do not have data on other pupil or parent characteristics. However, in 
some additional models we use proxy measures for parents’ characteristics. As these 
variables are measured with error and not used in the main models, we discuss them in 
more detail in Section 4.3. 
In our setting, probably the most interesting school quality measure is the average 
standardized math test score from the 6th grade. The standardized math test was 
organized by the Finnish National Board of Education, which has monitored the 
learning results of comprehensive school pupils with the help of national standardized 
tests since 1998. About 20 percent of schools take part in these tests, but schools 
generally differ across tests. However, in the city of Helsinki all public schools have 
taken part in the tests. Despite the fact that all public schools participate in the 
standardized tests, the results are not publicly disclosed in Helsinki or in any cities in 
Finland, unlike many other countries.15  
Since the test scores are for the final phase of primary school, they reflect 
differences in both schools’ effectiveness (or value-added) and pupil composition (see 
e.g. Gibbons et al. 2013). Unfortunately, we do not have any information about the 
pupils’ prior achievement which could be used to construct a value-added measure. We 
return to this issue after we present our main results. 
 
3.3. Matching across boundaries 
In order to estimate the spatially differenced model, we match housing sales on 
opposite sides of catchment area boundaries based on sale year and building type. For 
each observation, we find the closest sale for the same year and building type on the 
opposite side of a catchment area boundary (see also Gibbons et al. 2013). In our 
baseline estimations, we use data where the maximum distance between matched units 
is 400 meters. In robustness analysis we vary this maximum distance from 400 to 200 
meters.16  
                                                                                                                                               
mother tongue. Pupils with special needs and foreign-language pupils receive their education partly in 
classes with regular pupils and partly in special groups. 
15 Therefore we are indirectly testing if homebuyers have ‘unofficial’ information about the differences in 
school quality in Helsinki.  
16 Gibbons et al. (2013) also use fake boundaries as placebo tests. We obviously cannot do this because 
there would be no variation in the school quality measure at a fake boundary within a catchment area. 
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3.4. Data and descriptive statistics 
Our data come from three sources. First, the school-specific characteristics were 
obtained from the Education Department of the city of Helsinki. Table 1 presents the 
descriptive statistics of these school characteristics as well as the share of pupils that go 
to the school that is assigned to them. The somewhat large variation in the share of 
pupils with special needs and foreign language students suggest that the schools are 
segregated. However, this variation does not seem to translate into large variation in 
math test scores.17 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for schools characteristics, N = 50. 
  Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Math test score 32.1 2.92 21 38 
% pupils with special needs 0.09 0.07 0 0.36 
% foreign-language pupils 0.11 0.10 0 0.44 
% pupils going to the school in their catchment area 0.71 0.13 0.36 0.91 
 
Second, we use unit level transaction price data. These data are voluntarily 
collected by a consortium of Finnish real estate brokers and the dataset is refined and 
maintained by the VTT Technical Research Centre of Finland. As not all real estate 
agencies participate in the consortium, the dataset represents a sample (albeit rather 
large) of the total volume of transactions. The transactions in our data took place in 
2008–2012. 
Finally, we use Statistics Finland’s grid database of for 2008. This database is 
based on 250 x 250 meters grids which contain, in addition to grid coordinates, 
information on the population structure, education, main type of activity and income, 
households' stage in life, type of buildings and number of jobs. We use these close 
neighbourhood data as control variables to assess the robustness of our results.  
Fig. 2 illustrates the detail of our close neighbourhood data for a small stretch of a 
single boundary.18 We use only multi-storey and row houses in order to make sure that 
                                                 
17 The maximum score in the math tests was 54 points. The exercises were in the fields of algebra, 
geometry and statistics, which were defined as important on the grounds of the National Curriculum in 
2004. 
18 For confidentiality reasons, we are not allowed to map the transactions.  
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The housing characteristics included in the data are the transaction price of the 
unit, floor area, age, broker’s estimate of the unit’s condition (used internally by the 
agency), building type, indicator that the building is situated on a freehold lot (rather 
than a city leasehold lot), indicator whether there is an elevator in the building, floor, 
total number of floors in the building, maintenance charge, distance to CBD and 
distance to nearest neighbour.20 In the analysis, we use only units that have at least two 
rooms (in addition to a kitchen) because smaller units are not suitable for families with 
children.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20 In Finland owner-occupied units in multi-unit buildings are part of cooperatives that are incorporated as 
limited liability companies. Buying a housing unit from a building means that one buys the shares of the 
company on the open market. The company owns all the common facilities (and usually the lot) and 
charges shareholders a maintenance charge for common costs.  
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics on dwellings and close neighbourhoods. 
  Full sample Matched sample (< 400 m) 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Number of observations 14,061 3,852 
Housing unit:         
Price (€) 251,244 152,787 255,211 162,428 
Floor area (m2) 68.6 27.4 67.5 25.1 
Age (years) 45.0 33.2 44.1 31.1 
Condition (broker estimate):         
Good (0/1) 0.65 0.48 0.65 0.48 
Satisfactory (0/1) 0.32 0.47 0.31 0.46 
Poor (0/1) 0.03 0.18 0.04 0.18 
Building type:         
Row (0/1) 0.09 0.29 0.06 0.25 
Multi-storey (0/1) 0.91 0.29 0.94 0.25 
Own lot (0/1) 0.71 0.45 0.80 0.40 
Elevator (0/1) 0.56 0.50 0.61 0.49 
Floor level 2.95 1.78 3.10 1.78 
Total number of floors 4.57 2.33 4.83 2.22 
Maintenance charge (€/m2/month) 3.26 1.07 3.28 1.20 
Road distance to CBD (km) 5.94 3.97 6.28 4.55 
Distance to match (km) 0.45 0.26 0.23 0.09 
Close neighbourhood (250 m x 250 m):       
Home ownership rate 0.51 0.20 0.51 0.19 
Mean income (€) 32,231 12,061 32,583 15,183 
% college degree adults 0.30 0.12 0.28 0.11 
Unemployment rate 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.03 
% pension households 0.22 0.10 0.21 0.10 
% households with children 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.10 
Number of  service jobs per capita 0.44 1.20 0.50 1.34 
Number of buildings 21.0 12.8 23.5 14.8 
Mean floor area of units (m2) 61.6 17.2 59.3 16.2 
Population 734 550 905 673 
% foreign language residents 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.05 
 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Main results 
This section presents our main results. Table 3 presents six model specifications. 
In Panel A, we include only the standardized test score, as this is the most often used 
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measure of school quality in prior literature. In Panel B, we add the share of pupils with 
special needs and the share of foreign language pupils.  
In both panels a richer set of control variables is added as we move across the 
columns.21 First, we control for housing unit characteristics in all specifications to 
capture systematic differences between matched units. In addition to unit-level 
heterogeneity, we need to worry about household heterogeneity because sorting of 
heterogeneous households across catchment areas and specifically at the catchment area 
boundaries may lead to bias if households have preferences for their neighbours’ 
characteristics (Bayer et al. 2007; Gibbons et al. 2013). In order to mitigate this issue, in 
column (2), we add close neighbourhood controls.22 Finally, in column (3) we add a 
third-order polynomial of distance to the catchment area boundary in order capture any 
spatial trends in prices due to amenities. We report both standard errors clustered at the 
boundary level and, due to the small number of clusters (33), also p-values from a wild 
bootstrap procedure.  
According to Table 3, the average standardized math test score of a school has a 
sizable positive effect on prices, both when included alone and when other quality 
measures are included as well. A one standard deviation increase in test scores increases 
prices by roughly 2.5 percent. This result is statistically significant both when using 
standard clustering and also when using the wild bootstrap. Reassuringly, the result is 
robust both to adding close neighbourhood controls and distance to the boundary 
polynomials.23 
Table 3 also shows that the other school quality measures are not capitalized into 
prices. The share of foreign language pupils obtains a negative coefficient, as one might 
expect based on earlier literature, but it is borderline statistically significant in only one 
specification (with wild bootstrap), where we do not control for close neighbourhood 
characteristics. 
                                                 
21 The full results of the models in Panel B of Table 3 are presented in Table A2 in the Appendix. 
22 If there is sorting exactly at the boundary, some of the neighborhood variables may be endogenous 
because of unobservable neighborhood characteristics that are correlated with the observable 
characteristics (Bayer at al. 2007 and Gibbons et al. 2013). Fortunately, we are able to control for a large 
set of household characteristics, making this problem less of a concern than in most previous studies. 
23 In Fig. A1 in the Appendix, we also show the effect in Panel A of Table 3 graphically using a standard 
RDD approach with local linear regressions. However, RDD is not suited to cases where school quality 
changes in a number of dimensions and when the interest lies on these different dimensions.  
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Table 3. The effect of school quality measures using cross-boundary differences.  
  Panel A: Test score 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Math test score 0.034*** 0.028*** 0.028*** 
  [0.010] [0.007] [0.007]    
  (0.080) (0.004) (0.006) 
N 3852 3852 3852 
R2 0.84 0.85 0.85 
  Panel B: Test score and pupil composition 
  (4) (5) (6) 
Math test score 0.032*** 0.027*** 0.026*** 
  [0.009] [0.008] [0.008]    
  (0.016) (0.022) (0.024) 
% special needs pupils 0.077 0.027 0.023 
  [0.146] [0.144] [0.146]    
  (0.706) (0.897) (0.915) 
% foreign-language pupils -0.183** -0.110 -0.105 
  [0.076] [0.075] [0.075]    
  (0.058) (0.248) (0.272) 
N 3852 3852 3852 
R2 0.84 0.85 0.85 
Unit characteristics yes yes yes 
Close neighbourhood characteristics no yes yes 
Distance to boundary polynomials no no yes 
Notes: The table reports results for spatially differenced models. The data include only observations with 
two or more rooms and for boundaries where access to grades 7–9 does not change. The maximum 
distance between matched units is 400 meters. The standard errors are clustered at the school boundary 
level and are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively, based on the clustered standard errors. P-values based on a wild bootstrap procedure 
with 999 repetitions are reported in parentheses. Unit and close neighbourhood characteristics are 
reported in Table 2. All the models include a quarter-year of sale dummies. 
 
 
4.2. Robustness using alternative samples 
The main identifying assumption of our econometric approach is that other 
neighbourhood characteristics develop smoothly across catchment area boundaries. 
Since we omit boundaries that coincide with major geographic obstacles and use a 
sample where the maximum distance between matched units is less than 400 meters, 
this assumption is likely to hold. Nonetheless, we have run a number of robustness 
checks, which are reported in Table 4.  
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The first issue is that some catchment area boundaries may coincide with a well-
known residential area division, such as zip codes. If some zip codes are particularly 
prominent, households may value such addresses, which may even be reflected as a 
discontinuity in prices at these zip code boundaries. In column (1) of Table 4, we 
present the results of a regression where we omitted catchment area boundaries that 
coincide with zip code boundaries. The results remain the same for this sub-sample, 
indicating that the results are not driven by changes in these residential area boundaries.  
Second, in columns (2) and (3) of Table 4, we present results using our main 
specification where we further narrow the maximum distance between matched pairs 
first to 300 and then to 200 meters. The mean distances between matched units in these 
samples are 185 and 134 meters, respectively. Again, the results are roughly the same as 
when using the sample that allows for a longer maximum distance. In fact, the effect is 
slightly larger, but at the same time the estimates become more imprecise as the 
standard errors increase due to smaller sample size.  
Finally, we concentrate on boundaries where it is difficult to send a child to the 
school on the opposite side of the boundary.24 Here we use the share of children living 
within a catchment area that attend the school in their catchment area. If this share is 
large for a particular school, it might be more difficult for children from other 
catchment areas to attend that school. We label the schools for which this share is above 
the median of the schools in our data as high-intake schools. In column (4) of Table 4, 
we use only those observations that are on the “wrong” side of a high-intake school’s 
catchment area boundary. Also in this subsample, test scores are capitalized and the 
effect is of a similar magnitude as in the full sample. 
 Interestingly, at these boundaries the share of foreign language pupils also 
obtains a significant coefficient when inference is based on clustered standard errors. 
However, the number of clusters in this sample is only 26, so we are reluctant to rely on 
these standard errors. In fact, the wild bootstrap procedure produces a p-value of 0.126, 
meaning that we cannot reject the hypothesis of no effect.  
The final robustness check that we conducted is related to the timing of sales. In 
Tables 3 and 4, we used transactions for 2008 to 2012, but the school quality measures 
                                                 
24 Gibbons et al. (2013) do a similar exercise. They concentrate on boundaries where pupils rarely cross. 
We do not have this information available to us. We only know the share of pupils who chose the school 
in their own catchment area.  
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are for 2008. Of course, it is plausible to assume that school quality differences change 
slowly and using data for later years is not a major problem. Nonetheless, in Table A3 
in the Appendix we report results where we narrow this time window. Again, the results 
are roughly the same as those obtained using more data. 
 
Table 4. Robustness checks using alternative samples.  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
Same zip-
code 
Maximum 
distance < 
300m 
Maximum 
distance < 
200m 
Next to a 
high-intake 
area 
Math test score 0.024*** 0.035*** 0.038** 0.028*** 
  [0.005] [0.012] [0.016] [0.008]    
  (0.000) (0.052) (0.056) (0.044) 
% special needs pupils -0.027 0.188 0.03 0.28 
  [0.161] [0.185] [0.219] [0.321]    
  (0.971) (0.561) (0.873) (0.511) 
% foreign language pupils -0.080 -0.082 -0.038 -0.348**  
  [0.075] [0.076] [0.095] [0.159]    
  (0.410) (0.396) (0.805) (0.126) 
N 2725 2770 1515 1804 
R2 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.89 
Unit characteristics yes yes yes yes 
Close neighbourhood characteristics yes yes yes yes 
Distance to boundary polynomials yes yes yes yes 
Notes: The table reports results for spatially differenced models. The data include only observations with 
two or more rooms and for boundaries where access to grades 7–9 does not change. In columns (1) and 
(4) the maximum distance between matched units is 400 meters. The standard errors are clustered at the 
school boundary level and are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 
1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively, based on the clustered standard errors. P-values based on a wild 
bootstrap procedure with 999 repetitions are reported in parentheses. The unit and close neighbourhood 
characteristics are reported in Table 2. All the models include a quarter-year of sale dummies. 
 
 
4.3. Discussion of likely mechanisms 
The overall picture that emerges from Tables 3 and 4 is that school quality 
(broadly defined) is capitalized into house prices in Helsinki. However, it is not clear 
whether Finnish parents value school effectiveness in producing value-added or whether 
they value different aspects of pupil composition, such as good peers. The reason why 
we cannot make this distinction is that we do not have data on value-added, and the 
19 
 
standardized tests that we use were taken at the end of the first stage of elementary 
schooling. This means that the test scores are a mixture of both school effectiveness and 
pupil composition.  
Of course, we did control for the percentage of pupils with special needs and 
foreign language, which reflect pupil composition to a certain extent. However, these 
measures may be more related to extreme situations like classroom disturbance and how 
much these types of pupils drain teachers’ time and other resources. They do not 
measure the average or overall pupil composition that parents expect their child to be 
exposed to when attending a given school. 
Previous studies have used parental background to capture composition effects 
(e.g. Downes and Zabel 2002, Clapp et al. 2008, Brasington and Haurin 2009, Fack and 
Grenet 2010, Gibbons et al. 2013). We can follow these studies, although only 
imperfectly. To do so, we calculated average income and the share of highly educated 
residents (% with at least a college degree) within each school catchment area using the 
grid database. Unfortunately, these are biased measures of parents’ characteristics, 
because they are based on all residents within a catchment area, not just those with 
school-aged children and because some parents send their children to schools in other 
catchment areas (see Table 1). For these reasons, these variables should be seen as 
proxies and one should be careful when interpreting the magnitude of the coefficients of 
these variables.  
Table 5 presents results where these two variables are added into our main model 
specification. In column (1), we add only mean income, in column (2) education level, 
and finally, in column (3) both. We learn two things from Table 5. First, the coefficients 
for the two proxy variables are as expected, when added individually into the model 
indicating that they are meaningful proxies for parental background.25 Second, and more 
importantly, once we add either or both of the proxies for parental background, the test 
score coefficient diminishes considerably. This suggests that a large part of the test 
score effect can be explained by pupil composition.  
                                                 
25 In column (3), where we control both mean income and education level, the estimate for the latter is 
negative and significant. Even though this is somewhat surprising, one should be very careful with the 
interpretation of the coefficients of income and education in column (3). First, the partial effect of 
education is generally different when we condition and when we do not condition on income. Second, 
since both proxy variables are measured with error, it is difficult to know how measurement error affects 
the estimates in this case.  
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Table 5. Effects of school quality and catchment area measures.  
  (1) (2) (3) 
Math test score 0.011 0.018** 0.012**  
  [0.008] [0.008] [0.006]    
  (0.156) (0.052) (0.030) 
% special needs pupils -0.016 0.045 -0.163 
  [0.125] [0.143] [0.123]    
  (0.949) (0.861) (0.380) 
% foreign language pupils -0.022 -0.031 0.003 
  [0.080] [0.077] [0.058]    
  (0.815) (0.675) (0.957) 
Catchment area income 0.048***   0.066*** 
  [0.012]   [0.015]    
  (0.002)   (0.001) 
Catchment area education   0.301* -0.455**  
    [0.175] [0.186]    
    (0.220) (0.024) 
N 3852 3852 3852 
R2 0.84 0.85 0.85 
Unit characteristics yes yes yes 
Close neighbourhood characteristics yes yes yes 
Distance to boundary polynomials yes yes yes 
Notes: The table reports results for spatially differenced models. The data include only observations with 
two or more rooms and for boundaries where access to grades 7 through 9 does not change. The 
maximum distance between matched units is 400 meters. The standard errors are clustered at the school 
boundary level and are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 
10 percent level, respectively, based on the clustered standard errors. P-values based on a wild bootstrap 
procedure with 999 repetitions are reported in parentheses. Unit and close neighbourhood characteristics 
are reported in Table 2. All the models include a quarter-year of sale dummies. 
 
Of course, the above results do not completely rule out the possibility that parents 
are also paying for school effectiveness. However, there are some additional reasons 
which make this mechanism unlikely in the Finnish case. First, it is very difficult for 
parents to obtain information on value-added or school effectiveness. To our 
knowledge, no school-level value-added measures have been estimated for either 
primary or lower secondary schools in Finland. Moreover, previous research shows that 
without publicly released value-added measures, it might be either challenging for 
parents to identify schools with superior value-added or they might simply use test 
scores as an imperfect proxy for school effectiveness (see e.g. Rothstein 2006, Zhang 
2013). Second, several studies have found that the most selective schools or schools 
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with favourable student composition are not the top schools in terms of value-added. 
For example, Abdulkadiroglu et al. (2014) show that exam schools, which are very 
popular and selective lower secondary schools, have little effect on student achievement 
(or value-added) in Boston and New York. Similarly, Zhang (2013) finds that in China 
the most sought-after elite middle schools are those with the highest student 
achievement level, rather than those with the largest value-added effect on test scores.  
Finally, it is unlikely that differences in value-added would be considerable 
among primary schools in Helsinki. Given that the share of qualified teachers (i.e. 
teachers with a Master’s degree in education) is very high in Finnish schools overall, 
and especially in the Helsinki metropolitan area, one would expect differences in 
effectiveness to be much smaller than in many other countries. In fact, we know from 
recent research that even in very selective Finnish upper secondary schools, value-added 
estimates are very similar or indistinguishable from most other schools (Kortelainen et 
al. 2014). Given our additional results and the discussion above, we think that it is likely 
that most of the price response to test scores is related to pupil composition.  
 
5. Conclusions 
In this paper, we use hedonic regression techniques with a boundary discontinuity 
research design to study whether school quality differences are capitalized into house 
prices in Helsinki, the capital city of Finland. The Finnish case is of particular interest 
because by international comparison Finnish pupil achievement is high and school 
quality differences are among the lowest in the world.  
We find that, even in this environment, school quality differences are capitalized 
into house prices. More precisely, a one standard deviation increase in standardized test 
scores increases prices by roughly 2.5 percent. The magnitude of this effect is 
comparable to countries where school quality differences are much larger, such as the 
U.K. and the U.S. Additional results based on proxies of parents’ characteristics suggest 
that this result is driven by parents demand for socio-economically favourable pupil 
composition, not for school effectiveness. 
The results indicate that Finnish parents do perceive clear quality differences 
among elementary schools, even though school differences in student achievement are 
low by international comparison. This also suggests that residential-based school 
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assignment can lead to residential segregation even in an environment where differences 
in school effectiveness are low and overall performance high, and where school quality 
measures are not publicly disclosed.  
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Appendix. Additional figures and tables.  
 
Table A1. Descriptive statistics for dwelling and close neighbourhood characteristics, 
alternative sub-samples based on maximum match distance. 
  Matched sample (< 300 m) Matched sample (< 200 m) 
  Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev. 
Number of observations 2,770 1,515 
Housing unit:         
Price (€) 258,200 162,961 257,108 154,744 
Floor area (m2) 67.1 25.3 66.2 25.2 
Age (years) 41.8 31.7 41.0 31.1 
Condition (broker estimate):         
   Good (0/1) 0.67 0.47 0.68 0.47 
   Satisfactory (0/1) 0.30 0.46 0.29 0.45 
   Poor (0/1) 0.04 0.19 0.04 0.19 
Building type:         
   Row (0/1) 0.06 0.24 0.05 0.21 
   Multi-storey (0/1) 0.94 0.24 0.95 0.21 
Own lot (0/1) 0.82 0.39 0.84 0.37 
Elevator (0/1) 0.66 0.47 0.72 0.45 
Floor level 3.18 1.81 3.29 1.89 
Total number of floors 4.92 2.29 5.07 2.33 
Maintenance charge (€/m2/month) 3.31 1.27 3.38 1.47 
Road distance to CBD (km) 6.18 4.62 5.83 4.60 
Distance to match (km) 0.18 0.07 0.13 0.04 
Close neighbourhood (250 m x 250 m):       
Home ownership rate 0.50 0.20 0.48 0.20 
Mean income (€) 32,199 15,906 31,555 15,443 
% college degree adults 0.28 0.11 0.28 0.10 
Unemployment rate 0.06 0.04 0.07 0.03 
% pension households 0.21 0.10 0.19 0.09 
% households with children 0.14 0.10 0.14 0.09 
Number of  service jobs per capita 0.52 1.25 0.38 0.65 
Number of buildings 23.2 14.4 24.2 12.4 
Mean floor area of units (m2) 58.5 16.0 56.3 14.9 
Population 940 683 1051 701 
% foreign language residents 0.10 0.05 0.09 0.05 
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Table A2.Full results for the main model specifications. 
  Coeff. S.D. Coeff. S.D. Coeff. S.D. 
Constant 0.002 0.009 -0.003 0.011 0.043 0.025 
Math test score 0.032*** 0.009 0.027*** 0.008 0.026*** 0.008 
% special needs pupils 0.077 0.146 0.027 0.144 0.023 0.146 
% foreign language pupils -0.183** 0.076 -0.110 0.075 -0.105 0.075 
log(floor area) 0.892*** 0.060 0.894*** 0.058 0.893*** 0.057 
log(age) -0.051**** 0.008 -0.060**** 0.011 -0.059**** 0.010 
Good (0/1) 0.168*** 0.020 0.153*** 0.020 0.151*** 0.019 
Satisfactory (0/1) 0.073*** 0.021 0.059*** 0.017 0.059*** 0.017 
Own lot (0/1) 0.065** 0.025 0.080** 0.022 0.084*** 0.022 
Elevator (0/1) -0.003 0.023 -0.007 0.022 -0.008 0.021 
Floor level 0.020*** 0.003 0.019*** 0.003 0.019*** 0.003 
Total number of floors -0.011**** 0.002 -0.010**** 0.002 -0.010**** 0.002 
Maintenance charge -0.007 0.005 -0.009 0.005 -0.009 0.005 
Road distance to CBD (km) 0.127* 0.070 0.159*** 0.050 0.165*** 0.048 
Homeownership rate     -0.121 0.063 -0.123* 0.063 
Mean income (€)     0.106*** 0.027 0.110*** 0.030 
% college degree adults     0.302 0.205 0.311 0.207 
Unemployment rate     -0.372 0.303 -0.371 0.324 
% pension households     -0.135 0.155 -0.118 0.153 
% households with children     -0.142 0.159 -0.127 0.157 
Number of  service jobs per capita   -0.003 0.005 -0.002 0.005 
Number of buildings     0.002** 0.001 0.002** 0.001 
Mean floor area of units (m2)     -0.162** 0.074 -0.165** 0.078 
Population     -0.000036* 0.000 -0.000035* 0.000 
% foreign language residents     -0.051 0.203 -0.030 0.197 
N 3852 3852 3852 
R2 0.84 0.85 0.85 
Distance to boundary polynomials no no yes 
Notes: The table reports the full results for spatially differenced models, corresponding to Table 3 in the 
main text. The data include only observations with two or more rooms and for boundaries where access to 
grades 7–9 does not change. The maximum distance between matched units is 400 meters. The standard 
errors are clustered at the school boundary level and are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent level, respectively, based on the clustered standard 
errors. All the models include a quarter-year of sale dummies. 
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Table A3. Additional robustness checks with respect to sale year. 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  Baseline 
sale year < 
2012 
sale year < 
2011 
sale year < 
2010 
Math test score 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.028*** 0.037*** 
  [0.008]    [0.008] [0.009] [0.009]    
  (0.024) (0.016) (0.022) (0.006) 
% special needs pupils 0.023 0.049 0.061 0.037 
  [0.146]    [0.175] [0.193] [0.202]    
  (0.915) (0.853) (0.833) (0.889) 
% foreign language pupils -0.105 -0.150 -0.130 -0.133 
  [0.075]    [0.093] [0.089] [0.093]    
  (0.272) (0.238) (0.280) (0.282) 
N 3,852 3,100 2,273 1,403 
R2 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.87 
Unit characteristics yes yes yes yes 
Close neighbourhood characteristics yes yes yes yes 
Distance to boundary polynomials yes yes yes yes 
Notes: The table reports results for spatially differenced models. The data include only observations with 
two or more rooms and for boundaries where access to grades 7–9 does not change. The maximum 
distance between matched units is 400 meters. The standard errors are clustered at the school boundary 
level and are reported in brackets. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
level, respectively, based on the clustered standard errors. P-values based on a wild bootstrap procedure 
with 999 repetitions are reported in parentheses. The unit and close neighbourhood characteristics are 
reported in Table 2. 
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Figure A1. Discontinuity in test scores and prices.  
Notes: The figure depicts fits and confidence intervals for local linear regressions with a triangular kernel. 
The left-hand-side variable is the residual from a hedonic price regression where we control for unit and 
close neighbourhood characteristics. The bandwidth in the local linear regression is 150. The confidence 
interval does not account for clustering. 
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